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The Demographic-Economic Framework of Migration 
The violent repression put in place by Syrian authorities against the anti-government protests which began 
in March 2011 is causing massive population displacements in Syria. For the most part, these movements 
are temporary and internal: however, the relevance of Syrian refugees entering Turkey, Jordan and 
Lebanon is currently on the rise. As of 22 October (2011), 7,749 Syrian citizens are based in four camps 
along the Turkish-Syrian border according to the Turkish government. This figure results from 19,382 
arrivals vs. 11,633 returns observed since March 2011 (Government of Turkey, 2011). In Lebanon, since 
April 2011, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has assisted over 9,000 people 
fleeing Syria. Among them, many returned, while others were relocated inside Lebanon. Today, there are 
4,840 Syrian refugees (905 families) registered with the UN Agency, residing mostly with host families in 
precarious conditions (UNHCR, 2011). In Jordan, as of 28 December (2011), nearly 2,000 Syrians are 
registered with UNHCR, though larger numbers are estimated. Here, they tend either to stay with relatives 
or to rent accommodation on their own (UN Children’s Fund - UNICEF, 2011). These figures are particularly 
striking if we look at the number of Syrians registered with UNHCR before the crisis (2010, Jan 1st): 198 in 
Jordan, 64 in Lebanon and 9 in Turkey. 
Despite the difficulty of drawing global scenarios for the immediate future – a result as well of scarcity of 
data on the real situation inside the country – the scale of governmental repression as well as the weak 
reaction of the international community may foreshadow a potential refugee crisis which, together with the 
Libyan crisis (see the CARIM-Migration Profile on Libya at 
http://www.carim.org/public/migrationprofiles/MP_Libya_EN.pdf), would seriously aggravate the already 
precarious equilibria at the borders of Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries.  
Historically, Syria experienced several waves of emigration due to socio-political events, economic 
fluctuations and high rates of unemployment. The majority of outward flows have been directed towards 
other Arab countries, despite Syrian emigrants’ profile often differing according to destination country, the 
type of move envisaged and the period of emigration. At the end of the 1950s, a first wave of emigration 
was observed among the Syrian elite – including entrepreneurs and professionals – aimed at avoiding the 
rigid regulations implemented by the socialist regime at home and benefiting from job market opportunities 
in certain Arab countries and, to a lesser extent, in the US. In the mid-1970s, the expanding economic 
opportunities in the Gulf as well as the labour shortages created in Lebanon as a result of the civil war 
(1975-1989) resulted in a second big wave of emigration, this time of low skilled Syrians. While outward 
flows to the Gulf slowed in the 1980s after the implementation of policies limiting Arab immigrants, Syrian 
unskilled emigration to Lebanon continued in large numbers until 2005. In that year, the assassination of 
the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri and the withdrawal of the Syrian Army from Lebanon 
undermined the already precarious living conditions of Syrian workers in Lebanon so that large numbers of 
returned home (Mehchy and Mahadi Doko, 2011; Kawakibi, 2009, Fargues, 2009) though many are 
believed today to be back in Lebanon (Fargues, 2009). 
As to immigration patterns, despite the absence of reliable and official statistics, Syria is considered a 
main receiver in the region. Immigrants in Syria can be grouped into three main groups: refugees; labour 
migrants; and transit migrants. Refugees are by far the largest group. Labour migrants include domestic 
workers, originating mainly in southeast Asia and highly-skilled employees, who started to arrive in 
concomitance with the economic and legal reforms accompanying the recent transition of Syria to a social 
market economy in 2005. Finally, there are transit migrants who enter Syria mainly from Asia. 
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1 According to a survey managed by the Fafo Foundation and the Damascus-based Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, in 2001 
only 27,000 first-generation Palestinian refugees were living in Syria (Tiltnes, 2007).   
2 Palestinians in Syria either live in camps or outside of camps. Among the latter, they can be distinguished as those living in ‘gatherings’ 
– clusters of households – and those who live isolated from others. The survey focused on Palestinians living in camps and in 
gatherings of more than 25 Palestinian refugee households, the other group being nearly impossible to reach. 
Outward migration Inward migration 
Stock 
According to destination country statistics, the 
number of Syrian emigrants living abroad c. 2010 is 
415,745 individuals, or 1.9% of the total resident 
population in Syria.  They are mainly to be found in 
the Gulf states (28.9%), followed by European 
Union Member States (26.4%) and by other 
Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries 
(22.1%). Among destination countries Saudi Arabia 
comes first (26.2%) followed by the US (15.4%) and 
Lebanon (10.6%).  
Country/area of 
residence
Definition 
(a)
Reference 
date      
(1 Jan)
Source Number %
109,913 26.4
  of which Germany (B) 2010 Central register of foreigners 31,583 7.6
Sweden (A) 2010 Population Register 19,646 4.7
France (A) 2005 Population Census 15,510 3.7
Romania (A) 2009 Population Register 7,541 1.8
Netherlands (A) 2010 Population Register 6,946 1.7
Spain (A) 2010 Population Register 4,941 1.2
Greece (B) 2006 Residence permits 5,747 1.4
Others 17,999 4.3
120,524 28.9
  of which Saudi Arabia (A) 1995 GMOD, v. 4 (c) 109,048 26.2
UAE (A) 1993 GMOD, v. 4 (c) 6,379 1.5
Others 5,097 1.2
92,226 22.1
  of which Lebanon (B) 1997 Enquête "Conditions de vie des 
ménages" ACS 
44,129 10.6
Jordan (B) 2004 Population Census 38,130 9.1
Egypt (B) 2006 Population Census 4,560 1.1
Others 5,407 1.3
94,082 22.6
  of which US (A) 2009 Annual Population Survey 64,112 15.4
Canada (A) 2006 Population Census 18,800 4.5
Australia (A) 2008 Migration Australia (estimates) 8,599 2.1
Others 2,571 0.6
416,745 100.0
European Union
Gulf States
Selected SEM countries
Rest of the world (selected countries)
Total
Syrian emigration stocks residing in selected countries, most recent data (circa  2010)
(b) The sources, reference dates and definitions used for other EU countries are: 1. Population Registers for 
Austria (2009, A), Belgium (2010, B), Bulgaria (2009, B), Cyprus (2009, A), Czech Republic (2010, A), Denmark 
(2010, A), Estonia (2008, B), Finland (2010, A), Italy (2010, B), Latvia (2010, A), Lithuania (2008, A), Poland 
(2010, A), and Slovenia (2010, A); 2. Residence permits for Hungary (2010, B), and Malta (2008, B); 3. 
Register/Database for Foreigners for Portugal (2010, B), and Slovakia (2010, B); Household Survey for Ireland 
(2010, A); Population census for Luxembourg (2001, B), and United Kingdom (2001, A).
(c) The Global Migrant Origin Database, version 4 (GMOD, v.4) is provided by the Development Research 
Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty.  The sources, reference dates and definitions used for the Gulf 
States are 1. Population census for Bahrain (2001, A), and Oman (1993, A); 2. “source unclear or not stated but 
obtained from National Statistics Bureau” for Kuwait (2001, A), Saudi Arabia (1995, A), and United Arab 
Estimates (1993, A); and 3. “unknown, need check with United Nations” for Iraq (2000, A). 
(d) "Others" include Algeria (Population Census, 1998, B), Morocco (Direction Générale de la Sûreté Nationale , 
2010, B), Palestine (Population Census, 2007, A), Tunisia (Population Census, 2004, B), and Turkey 
(Population Census, 2000, B).
(e) "Others" include New Zealand (Population Census, 2006, A), Norway (Population Register, 2009, A), and 
Switzerland (Population Register, 2008, B).
see note (b)
see note (c)
see note (d)
see note (e)
(a) Immigrants are defined as "foreign-born" (A), or "non nationals" (B)
There are, however, two main reasons why 
these estimates are not able to explain the whole 
phenomenon and why interpretations must be 
made with caution.  
First figures referring to Syrian migrants living in 
the Gulf countries are outdated and – given the 
Stock 
According to census data, in 2004, 102,396 
foreign nationals resided in Syria, or 0.6% of the 
total population. The majority of these were other 
Arab nationals (86.5%) and non-Arab Asian 
nationals (9.4%). 
Number %
Other-Arab Countries 46,167 42,399 88,566 86.5
Europe 1,165 1,915 3,080 3.0
Non-Arab African Countries 356 200 556 0.5
Non-Arab Asian Countries 4,364 5,274 9,638 9.4
Oceania 28 19 47 0.0
America 250 259 509 0.5
Total n.a. n.a. 102,396 100.0
Foreign nationals residing in Syria by country of citizenship and sex, 2004
Source: 2004 Syrian population census 
Country of citizenship Males Females
Total
% on the total resident population 0.6
Such figures, however, did not include either 
Palestinian or Iraqi refugees. Immigrants in Syria 
can, in fact, be categorized into three main groups: 
refugees; labour migrants; and transit migrants.   
The first is by far the more relevant from a 
quantitative perspective. Among refugees, 
Palestinians and Iraqis form the largest groups.  
According to estimates made by the Palestinian 
Bureau of Statistics and Natural Resources of 
Damascus, in 2009 Palestinians were 467,956, the 
vast majority being, however, not migrants but 
second and now third generation Palestinian 
refugees – refugees in relation to 1948.1  
In 2001, an ad hoc survey (see note 1) enabled 
the detection of various aspects of Palestinians’ 
living conditions in Syria,2 as well as in Jordan and 
Lebanon.  
Males Females Total
Syria (2001) 23.0 9.0 75.0 21.0 48.0
Jordan (2001) 31.0 10.0 <70.0 13.0 n.a.
Lebanon (1998) 35.0 10.0 <70.0 16.0 n.a.
(*) The poverty rate is defined as the percentage of households earning less than 2 US 
dollars per day.
Source: Fafo surveys (cited in Hanssen-Bauer and Jacobsen, 2007, and Egset and al-Madi, 
2007.
Labour market participation ratePoverty rate 
(*)
Unemployment 
rate
Country of 
residence
Selected socio-economic indicators of Palestinians residing in Syria, Jordan, and 
Lebanon, years around 2000
Overall, Palestinians in Syria show lower poverty 
rates than in Lebanon and Syria. Poor households, 
defined as families who earn less than 2 US dollars 
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reluctance of these states in disseminating data on 
population by nationality – no more recent 
estimates can be proffered. Syrian statistics cannot 
help here, since no estimate of Syrian citizens living 
abroad is given out by the authorities.  
Second, these figures do not include a 
significant group, the Syrian migrants working in 
Lebanon who, despite the absence of statistical 
data on back-and-forth mobility, are known to move 
on a circular or temporary basis. Also before the 
Lebanese Civil war (early 1970s), Syrian workers 
were estimated at more than 200,000 (Fargues, 
2009). During the Civil war (1975-1989) their 
numbers peaked due to the presence of labour 
shortages left open by hundreds of thousands 
Lebanese emigrants and given too Syrian control of 
Lebanese territory and the Lebanese border which 
eased Syrians entries and exits (Fargues, 2009). 
After the war, these movements continued and 
flourished, pushed up by reconstruction works and 
thanks to visa facilitation agreements. Syrian 
workers in Lebanon have never been counted and 
estimates range from 300,000 to 500,000 
individuals (Mehchy, 2011); i.e. from 5.5% to 9.2% 
of the working age population living in Syria in 
2010. According to a recent study conducted by 
Infopro in 2008, these migrants tend to be male, 
poorly educated and employed in low skilled and 
scarcely protected jobs: 3 out of 4 Syrians in 
Lebanon work in the construction sector, while the 
rest are employed in agriculture and cleaning 
services. Family migration seems, instead, to be 
related to concierge jobs, for which housing is 
guaranteed free of charge (Balanche, 2007).   
Overall, Syrian emigrants have an intermediate 
skilled profile: 37.6%, 31.3%, and 31.1% hold, 
respectively, a low, medium and high level of 
education. This profile hides, however, large 
differences according to destination country. Syrian 
emigrants residing in (selected) non OECD-
countries are significantly less educated than those 
living in OECD states: in the former area, the 
majority (51.4%) has a low level of education, while 
only 14.4% have a high-skilled profile; the same 
proportions in the OECD area equal 34.4% and 
35.0%. Among OECD countries, the US is the 
country with the highest percentage of highly-skilled 
Syrian migrants (36.6%) (source: DIOC-E dataset). 
per day, represent 23% of Palestinian households 
in Syria, vs. 35% and 31% in Lebanon and Jordan, 
respectively. Extreme poor households, for whom 
the poverty threshold is fixed at 1 US dollar per day, 
account for 5% of all Palestinian households in 
Syria vs. 15% and 9% in respectively Lebanon and 
Jordan (Hanssen-Bauer and Jacobsen, 2007). So, 
despite Syria being, generally speaking, poorer 
than Lebanon and Jordan, Palestinians tend to 
perform better because they are more likely to be 
included in the labour market: the adult labour force 
participation rate is 48%, i.e. 75% for males (vs. 
less than 70% both in Lebanon and Jordan) and 
21% for females (vs. 16% in Lebanon and 13% in 
Jordan). The highest labour force participation rates 
are found in rural parts of Damascus. As to 
employment performances, differences are not so 
pronounced: the unemployment rate ranges, 
indeed, from 9% in Syria to 10% in Lebanon and 
Jordan. Nevertheless, if we consider only refugees 
living in the camps, Palestinians in Syria tend to 
perform substantially better by registering an 
unemployment rate of 9%, vs. 13% in Jordan and 
17% in Lebanon. These positive outcomes are 
largely the result of undiscriminating access 
conditions to employment enjoyed by Palestinians 
in Syria, including access to its large public sector 
in which around 36% of Palestinians are, it is 
estimated, employed (Egset and al-Madi, 2007).   
Despite Syria being considered the most 
significant receiver of Iraqi refugees, these Iraqi 
refugees have never been counted. Controversial 
figures assess their number at 1.2 million in 2007 
(source: Syrian authorities), dropping to 1 million in 
2010 (source: UNHCR). Like their true size, the 
living conditions of Iraqis are largely unknown. 
Nevertheless, unlike Palestinians, they are not 
permitted to work or open their own business so 
they are dependent on external financial support, 
including their savings, remittances and 
humanitarian assistance, and participation in 
informal market activities (Mehchy, 2011). 
Other refugees registered with UNHCR amount 
to 5,414 in 2010, mainly originating in Somalia 
(51.0%), and Afghanistan (29.8%) (source: 
UNHCR). Moreover, Syria hosts around 300,000 
stateless Kurds who have been living without 
Syrian citizenship, and thus without fundamental 
civil rights, since 1962 (Mehchy, 2011). 
The second group of immigrants living in Syria 
includes highly-skilled employees and domestic 
workers. As to the former, they have recently  been 
attracted by the need for foreign experts in the 
Syrian economy especially in certain sectors 
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As to their occupational profile, Syrian emigrants 
tend to be employed at high occupational levels 
regardless of destination. 65.5% are employed in 
“high skilled white collar” jobs – such as legislators, 
managers, professionals, etc. – , i.e. 93.9% in 
(selected) non-OECD countries and 44.5% in the 
OECD area (source: DIOC-E dataset). 
Again, it should be mentioned that the DIOC-E 
dataset, from which the abovementioned figures 
are taken, does not include either Syrian people 
living in the Gulf or Syrian temporary migrants 
working in Lebanon. 
Flows 
Thanks to flow statistics collected by the 4 main 
OECD countries of destination for Syrian emigrants, 
namely US, Germany, Canada and Sweden, it is 
possible to reconstruct the magnitude of Syrian 
migration towards these countries in the last 4 
decades, i.e. from 1970 to 2008. 
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Inward flows of Syrian nationals in Canada, Germany, Sweden and US, 1970-2008
The rise of migration flows in the more recent 
period (1990-2008) seems to confirm the search for 
destinations outside the Arab world following the 
diminished opportunities for entering the Gulf.  
In the last decade, however, migration patterns 
seem to have remained almost stable despite 
fluctuations. This is confirmed by the inward flows in a 
(telecommunications, banking, insurance, etc.) a 
result of the rise of foreign and local investments 
following the transition to a social market economy. 
Their employment status is specifically regulated by 
a recent labor law 17/2010, according to which they 
are 1. required to have specific expertise that is not 
available among Syrians and 2. to train Syrian 
workers in order to make them rapidly obtain the 
necessary experience. Following these legal 
provisions, the Syrian authorities started in 2010 to 
record foreign employees. In June 2010, their 
number was estimated at 995 by the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Labour (MOSAL), despite there 
being a general consensus that larger numbers of 
foreign experts, particularly from Russia, have been 
living in Syria with their families for long periods of 
time. The press estimates from 5,000 to 7,500 
foreign workers (see Mehchy, 2011). 
The presence of domestic workers has been, 
instead, on the rise since 2001, following the 
legalization of foreign nationals as domestic 
workers. It peaked after 2006, as a result of the 
organization of this work under specific manpower 
agencies. In 2010, Syrian manpower agencies 
estimated their number at around 75,000-100,000 
individuals mainly women from Indonesia, the 
Philippines and Ethiopia. According to many 
experts, they represent a particular vulnerable 
group since they are de facto excluded from 
Syrian labour law and subjected to poor working 
conditions and abuse. 
Finally, a third group of immigrants includes 
transit migrants, who mainly originate in Asia and 
the CIS countries (Sørensen, 2006). 
Flows 
No official statistics are currently available on legal 
inward migration flows entering Syria. According to 
the United Nations Department of Social Affairs, the 
net migration rate was substantially negative in the 
period 1955-2010, except for a 5-year period 2000-
2005, when, they estimate, a positive rate was 
observed, due to the massive influx of Iraqis 
following the US invasion in 2003. 
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(*) Level of education is established according to the 1997 International Standard 
Classification of Education (ISCED) of UNESCO. Low level of education includes: Level 0 –
Pre-primary education; Level 1 – Primary education or first stage of basic education; Level 2 
– Lower secondary or second stage of basic education. Medium level of education includes: 
Level 3 – (Upper) secondary education;  Level 4 – Post-secondary non-tertiary education.  
High level of education includes: Level 5 – First stage of tertiary education; Level 6 –
Second stage of tertiary education.
Source: DIOC-E dataset
Syrian emigration stocks residing in OECD countries and in selected non-
OECD countries by level of education (*) and area of residence, circa 2000
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wider range of OECD destinations (see figure below). 
(*) Selected countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the United States
Source: Author's own elaboration on nationals sources taken from "International 
Migration Flows to and from selected countries, The 2008 Revision," UN
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The Legal Framework of Migration  
The legal framework governing migration in Syria is quite similar to the frameworks of other states in the 
Mashreq, due to similar national and regional issues. The law relating to foreign nationals is lacking and 
heterogeneous, being based largely on administrative/executive decisions rather than legislation. The 
conditions for aliens to enter, stay in and exit from the country were defined in a presidential decree of 
1970, and some ministerial decisions complement and fill out its provisions. Arab nationals are favoured as 
regards access to the territory, to work and to nationality. A recent regulation tends to frame and protect the 
most vulnerable migrants: some decisions have been adopted to govern the employment of domestic 
workers, who are still not covered by labour law, and a decree against trafficking in persons has been 
published. Yet, no bilateral convention links Syria to foreign labour-sending countries, and especially 
domestic worker senders like the Philippines and Indonesia. 
Aliens generally work in the informal sector. 
No overall law deals with Syrian emigration but a series of measures adopted since the beginning of the 
2000s aim at enhancing links with expatriates. Notably, the conditions for exemption from military service 
have been progressively relaxed to remove what was an obstacle to the return – temporary or more long-
lasting – of Syrian emigrants and their descendants. Conscription is also an obligation for Syrians born 
abroad, and since the 1990s, it could be avoided by emigrants in the Gulf and in the US, provided that 
financial compensation was paid. In 2005, military service was reduced from thirty to twenty-four months, 
and the possibility of buying exemption with 2,000 US dollars was extended to all Syrians born abroad who 
have resided there since the age of 18. Those who were born in Syria and who left it before the age of 11 
and who had lived abroad for more than 15 years could also be exempted with the payment of 5,000 euros. 
In 2009, a new law harmonised the situation of all the emigrants who can now buy their freedom from 
military service after five years abroad and with the payment of US 6,500 dollars. These measures are, 
above all, to facilitate tourist visits on the part of Syrian expatriates and their descendants, as well as to 
improve public funding. 
Syria has no law on refugees. UNHCR deals with refugee-status determination procedure and their 
protection, while UNRWA3 is in charge of Palestinian refugees.  
Syria is the country where the situation of Palestinians is reputed to be the most favourable. Palestinian 
issues are ruled by Law n°260 of 10 July 1956 dedicated to those Palestinian refugees from the 1948 
exodus. It is stipulated that Palestinians who reside in the country when the law is promulgated will be 
considered as Syrian citizens of origin as regards employment, work, trade and military service. 
Palestinians are thus granted the same rights and duties as national citizens, with the exception of political 
rights and access to real estate. During the first two decades after 1948, an administrative directive forbade 
Palestinians from buying real estate in Syria. The prohibition has been lifted but some restrictions have 
remained, with limits of one house per family and a prohibition on the purchase of agricultural lands – 
unless there is an exceptional authorisation by decree from the Interior ministry (Law n°189 of 1952). Unlike 
other Arab nationals, Palestinians do not need a work permit. They are constrained to compulsory military 
service in the Palestine’s Liberation Army created in 1964, they can work in the public service, occupy a 
political position and travel with a Syrian laissez-passer valid for six years, just as national citizens can. 
The Palestinians who came from the 1956 and 1967 wars were registered with a service created in 1949 
and were granted the same rights as the 1948 refugees, with some exceptions: they are hired on the basis 
of temporary work contracts, they cannot benefit from hierarchical advancement in the public services and 
they do not carry out military service. All the Palestinians are assimilated to nationals regarding access to 
work (Law n°17 of 2010) and passport issuance (Law n°42 of 1975). 
Though they are considered as Syrian citizens by the law of 1956, Palestinian refugees resident in 
Syria are not given the right to be naturalised as people with Arab origin can be, which means with 
privileges stipulated in the nationality law. As in Egypt, Syria invokes its solidarity towards the Palestinian 
people’s fight. This policy has resulted in abandoning many Palestinians to statelessness in the name of 
preserving their future. 
                                                            
3 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees in the Near East. 
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Kurds are also affected by statelessness.  Due to a growing distrust from the Syrian nationalist regime 
towards Kurdish people  at the beginning of the 1960s – and after the failure of unity with Egypt – decree 
n°93 of 23 August 1962 called for an exceptional census in the province of Al-Hassakeh, in the North-
East of the country, where almost half of Syria’s Kurdish population lives. The Kurds there were accused 
of being from Turkish Kurdistan and illegally registered. They had to demonstrate that they had lived in 
the country at least since 1945, like most of the refugees from Kemalist Turkey in the 1920s or other 
elements of the Kurdish population which has settled in Syria in the last centuries. Tens of thousands 
and maybe hundreds of thousands of Kurds were deprived of their Syrian nationality as a result. The 
statelessness of these Kurds has been transmitted from generation to generation, though decree n°276 
of 1969 stipulates that children born in the country from stateless parents should be granted nationality. 
Kurds are granted a special identity card by the Interior ministry which also allows residence. As non-
citizens, they are deprived from access to real estate, to public services and to companies and from 
political rights. They are not allowed to join a professional organisation and thus cannot become 
engineers, doctors or journalists. In two speeches in 2005 and 2007, Bachar El Assad promised to 
resolve the situation of the Kurds who lost their nationality. Nothing was done till a Presidential decree 
dated 7 April 2011, which granted citizenship to over 100,000 of them.  
 
 Outward migration  Inward migration  
General 
legal 
references 
 
 Presidential decree n°29 of 1970 related to 
aliens’ entry and stay in Syria and their exit.  
Ministerial decree n°30 of 2007 related to Arab 
nationals’ entry and stay in Syria and their exit.  
 1990 Convention4: ratified. 
ILO: 49 conventions ratified5 
Bilateral agreements: Agreement on border posts with Lebanon (1999), agreements on 
Syrian workers with Qatar (2003 and 2008) and the United Arab Emirates (2008), 
manpower agreements with Jordan (2007) and Kowet (2008), among others. 
Member State of the League of Arab States. 
Circulation 
Entry and 
Exit 
The right to leave the country is not 
guaranteed in the Constitution. 
The emigration of civil servants 
is subject to authorisation and an 
exit visa.  
Law n°42 of 1975 on passport 
issuance; Presidential decree 
n°1623 of 1970 regulating Syrians’ 
exit and entry.  
A wife should generally follow 
her husband in emigration (family 
code, 1953) and can be prevented 
from emigrating alone by her 
husband (decision n°876 of 1979). 
A medical certificate indicating the absence of 
contagious disease should be presented at entry.  
Decision n°1350 of 15 August 1984: entry without 
visa for nationals from all Arab states, from the Gulf, 
from the Emirates and from the Sultanates.  
Entry visa requirement re-established for Iraqis in 
2007 (decision n°30 of 2007). 
Decision n°205 of 24 April 1972: Definition of 
entry and exit points. 
Exit visa for aliens. Presidential decree n°67 of 
2005 related to the exit tax for foreign and national 
citizens. 
                                                            
4 Convention on the Protection of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Family. 
5 Including conventions C111 concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation and C118 Equality of 
Treatment of Nationals and Non-Nationals in Social Security, but excluding conventions C97 concerning Migration for 
Employment, and C143 concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and 
Treatment of Migrant Workers. 
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Struggle 
against 
irregular 
migration 
Palermo protocols6: ratified 
Presidential decree n°3 of 2010 against trafficking in persons: 7 years in prison, 1 to 3 
million Syrian pounds. 
Law n°42 of 1975  
Irregular exit: 3 months in 
prison and/or 500 Syrian pounds. 
Decree n°29 of 1970: 
Irregular entry: 3 months to 1 year in prison 
and/or 500 to 1,000 Syrian pounds. 2 to 5 years in 
prison and/or 2,000 to 4,000 Syrian pounds if the 
alien is a national from a country at war with Syria.  
False documents at entry: 2 years in prison 
and/or 300 to 2,000 Syrian pounds. 
Irregular stay or exit: 3 months in prison and/or 
100 to 500 Syrian pounds. 
Work without permit: 6 months in prison and/or 
500 Syrian pounds. 
Rights and 
settlement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Law n°50 of 2004 related to civil 
service and emigration; Ministerial 
decree n°16 of 2007 on Syrian 
expatriates’ associations; Law 
n°36 of 2009 modifying the rules of 
emigrants’ military service: 
payment to be exempted from 
military service reduced (6,500$ 
after 5 years abroad). 
Law n°30 of 2007: Syrian 
emigrants with another nationality 
can avoid their military service in 
Syria if they do it in their other 
country.  
 
 
3 categories of stay permits: 5 year-permit for people 
residing for 15 years, or for 5 years if they are carrying 
out a useful activity for the country, or for wives of 
Syrian citizens after 2 years; a 3 year-permit for people 
born in Syria and living there for 3 years, or aliens 
residing for 5 years; 1 year-permit in other cases 
(Decree n°29 of 1970 and decree n°30 of 2007). 
Access to Employment: Laws n°50 of 2004 and 
n°17 of 2010: a ministerial authorisation is needed, 
based on the list of professions open to aliens and if 
there is reciprocity with the origin country. Work 
permit required. Arab nationals have facilitated 
access to most of professions. Decree of the Labour 
ministry n°2137/2009 of 21/07/2009 modifying article 
20 of ministerial decree n°2040/2005: the 
percentage of aliens in private financial 
establishments is limited to 3% provided their 
qualification is not locally available. The percentage 
of non-Arab workers in a company not to exceed 
10% (and 30% of the payroll).  
Domestic workers are not covered by the labour 
law but by a series of decisions since the Prime 
Minister’s decree n°81 of 2006 which imposed a 
working contract. Decree of the Interior Ministry n°29 
(12/03/2007) related to the entry of female migrant 
workers and their stay as domestics, and Arab and 
foreign nannies; decree n°62 of 2007 related to 
sanctions for contract violation; decision n°27 of 
2009 governing recruitment offices. Artists are 
governed by decision n°81 of 2008. 
Civil service: Open to Palestinians. Jobs there 
are also open to Arab nationals if the Prime minister 
considers it a national necessity (law n°50 of 2004). 
                                                            
6 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially women and children, and Protocol against the 
Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime, 15 November 2000. 
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Family reunification: Legal silence. 
Access to public services: access to food aid and 
public hospitals is not given to aliens. Iraqis have 
free access to health and education. Other aliens 
enjoy free access to education and quasi-free 
access to health services.  
Access to real estate ownership: excluded with 
some exceptions. 
Nationality: Legislative decree n°276 on the Syrian Arab nationality, 24 November 
1969; Regulation on application for naturalisation, withdrawal, renunciation and forfeit of 
nationality, decision n°92 of 22 June 1976. 
Jus sanguinis through paternal descent. A Syrian mother does not transmit her 
nationality, unless her child is born in the country without recognised paternity. There is no 
jus soli. Naturalisation is possible after a five year-residency in the country, unless one has 
a contagious disease. Arab fellows benefit from a facilitated access to nationality, being 
emigrants in a third country without any Arab nationality, or immigrants in Syria. Foreign 
women can obtain the nationality of her Syrian spouse after a two-year marriage and 
residence in the country or she will become a citizen immediately if she is an Arab. The 
Syrian women cannot transmit nationality to a foreign husband.  
Penal sanctions exist in the case of the acquisition of another nationality without 
authorisation from the Syrian authorities. Authorisation is given only if the military service 
obligations have been fulfilled. Dual nationality is tolerated. 
Refugees  1951 Convention7: not ratified. 
Protocol for the Treatment of Palestinians in 
Arab States, accepted. 
Palestinian refugees are under UNRWA’s 
mandate. 
Decision n°1531 of 6 September 1980: 
Issuance of stay visas to Palestinian refugees.  
Non-Palestinian refugees fall under UNHCR’s 
mandate. There is no national law on asylum or 
refugee status determination procedure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
7Geneva Convention relating to the status of refugees. 
 CARIM Migration Profile: Syria 
10                           CARIM - Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration (www.carim.org) 
The Sociopolitical Framework of Migration  
Syria is an important migration crossroads in the Middle East. As well as the Palestinian refugees who 
arrived in 1948, Syria hosts Iraqi refugees, who arrived, for the most part, post the 2003 invasion, and 
labour migrants from Asia and Africa. -Then, Syria is, simultaneously, a labour-sending country, with Syrian 
migrants heading toward Lebanon, the Arab Gulf, and the West. 
Since spring 2011, the violent repression against the protests in Syria have caused a significant, though 
limited, movement of refugees towards Turkey and Lebanon. In the cases when the security situation has 
got better, some of these refugees returned to their homes in the following days or weeks. Gradually, the 
Syrian army has positioned more troops along the borders in order to control those fleeing the country. 
However, on-going violence there might conceivably cause further movement of refugees. 
The Turkish government has opened its border to refugees. In contrast, the arrival of Syrian refugees in 
Lebanon has triggered strong political tensions. The Lebanese government, nominated in June 2011, 
includes the political parties supporting the strategic alliance with Syria (March 8 Alliance). The Lebanese 
army has expelled and driven back refugees on several occasions, but it has not the means to control all 
the frontier between Syria and Lebanon. 
UNHCR supports the Turkish and Lebanese authorities in registering and providing basic assistance to 
the refugees, occasionally even resettling them in third countries. In Turkey, four camps were created along 
the border. In the North of Lebanon, because of the close relations between the peoples on each side of 
the border, most refugees are hosted by relatives. 
Moreover, Syrians abroad, in particular those settled in Europe, play a significant role in the the 
opposition against the Syrian regime. For example, Burnan Ghalioum, an academic and human-rights 
activist residing in Paris for the last 30 years, is the head of the National Syrian Council, created in October 
2011, which brings together the various opposition groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Out-migration and the relations with Syrians abroad 
The first wave of migration from Syria started at the end of the nineteenth century and ended at the 
beginning of the 1930s, with a rush on the eve of WWI. This wave was part of the broader movement of 
migration from the middle-eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire, in particular from Mount Lebanon and 
Palestine, towards North and South America (the United States, Argentina, Brazil, etc.), and Egypt, West 
Europe and, to a lesser extent, Western Africa. The impact of European economic expansion on traditional 
social organization was the main cause of this wave, along with political and religious conflicts dividing the 
Ottoman Empire. As a consequence, Syrian-Lebanese communities gradually developed in the host 
countries, and maintained strong family and economic links with their country of origin. In New York, 
Buenos Aires, and Sao Paulo, the Syrian-Lebanese intellectual elite played a significant political role in the 
creation of the new Arab States when the Ottoman Empire finally disintegrated . 
The second wave of migration from Syria started at the end of the 1950s and continued until the 
present. The main countries of destination have been Lebanon, Jordan, and the Arab oil-producing 
countries, and Europe and North America.  
Syrian migration to Lebanon is exceptional because of the importance and the sustainability of the flows 
since the 1960s, with the exception of the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) and after the withdrawal of the 
Syrian army from Lebanon in 2005. It consists mostly of temporary and low-skilled circular labour migrants. 
The main causes of this migration is unequal economic development and the lack of obstacles to the free 
circulation of persons between Syria and Lebanon. At the end of the 1950s, the Lebanese authorities 
encouraged Syrian workers, to be used as a cheap and easily exploitable labour force, eventually causing a 
deterioration in the working conditions of low-skilled Lebanese workers. In parallel, Syria has not limited 
labour migration flows to Lebanon (except on certain occasions in order to exert political leverage on its 
neighbour), which has helped lower pressures on the labour market and has increased the remittances 
sent. In addition, after Syria took control of Lebanon in 1991, it imposed the signature of four bilateral 
agreements for social and economic cooperation, which included provisions for the free circulation of 
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persons, together with free labour, employment, and professional and economic activities8. The withdrawal 
of Syrian troops from Lebanon in 2005, in parallel with a series of violent acts against Syrian workers, was 
followed by a return movement, but such movements were limited, in time and quantity. Since then, internal 
political divisions in Lebanon have got in the way of the revision of said agreements.  
With the exception of Lebanon, and a series of administrative measures created to limit brain drain, the 
Syrian regime has not intervened in the management of labour migration. In contrast, the Ba’ath party tried 
to organize and control Syrians abroad for political and economic reasons.  
The creation of a certificate for so-called migrant citizens in 1963, after the dismantlement of the Arab 
United Republic, aimed at facilitating the position, the employment, and the economic investment of 
individuals of Syrian origin, as well as other Arab nationals. In 1969, the new naturalization law included 
provisions to facilitate the naturalization of migrant citizens. In parallel, after Syria’s defeat by Israel in 1967, 
Syria looked at setting up a political lobby among Syrians abroad to defend its interests. Syria eventually 
supported the creation of the Federation of Arab Entities (FEARAB) at Buenos Aires in 1963, however, the 
activities of this organization have been secondary. 
Moreover, several laws and measures were implemented during economic liberalization (Infitah, in the 
1970s, 1990s, and 2000s) with the aim of encouraging Syrian migrants (and other Arab nationals) to invest 
in Syria. In the early 2000s, after Bachar al-Assad came to power, international experts with Syrian origins 
were recruited to implement a program of economic reforms: Issam Zeïm, expert for the United Nation 
Development Program, was in charge of the Ministry of Planning; Ghassan Rifaï, former senior official from 
the World Bank, was in charge of the Ministry of Economy and Trade; Fadel Nibras, a graduate from the 
French Grandes écoles, became counsellor of the president for Administrative Reform; etc. However, the 
project failed in face of the Ba’ath party opposition and the private interests of entrepreneurs close to the 
regime. True, the liberalization of the banking system and of real estate growth attracted the Syrian middle 
class and Syrians abroad, but favoured speculation rather than sustainable economic growth. 
Refugees and labour migrants in Syria 
Labour migrants are mostly female domestic workers from the Philippines, Ethiopia and Sri Lanka, and low-
skill workers from Egypt and Sub-Saharan Africa, in addition to irregular migrants passing through Syria on 
their way to Lebanon or the European Union. 
Regarding domestic workers, the Syrian Interior ministry has regulated their recruitment with a special 
agency. For domestic workers, it imposed the contracting of accident insurance, days off, holidays, and 
suitable living conditions. These regulations strictly forbids marriage between a Syrian and a foreign 
domestic, in order to limit trafficking in women. Furthermore, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour 
adopted a law (n°2040, February 6th 2007) to ‘organise the agencies specialized in the recruitment and 
employment of foreign labourers and domestics’. This law strengthen the domestic’s rights and insists that 
the salary be written into the contract and that there be suitable housing. It entitles the domestics to medical 
care, it defines a set of sanctions in cases of violence or discrimination on the basis of nationality, race, or 
gender. Moreover, the law restricts the creation of new agencies, imposes the payment of significant taxes, 
limit the agencies’ fees (a percentage of the domestic’s salary), and notes that the agencies have the 
responsibility of repatriating the domestics in cases of problem. 
The Syrian government’s efforts to regulate the employment of foreign domestic workers could be 
extended to other sectors of labour migration. In the textile industry, for example, employers complain about 
manpower shortages, but the unions warn against important inflows of low-skilled migrants that would 
negatively impact salaries and working conditions in Syria. 
Moreover, Syria hosts great numbers of refugees, Palestinian and Iraqis mainly, but only the former are 
officially considered as such, and Syria has no asylum policy, nor, indeed, does it have an administrative 
procedure to grant refugee status. 
                                                            
8 Agreements of September 13th 1993, in the framework of the Treaty of Fraternity, Coordination and Cooperation of 
May 25th 1991. 
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In 1948, 100,000 Palestinians took refuge in Syria, that is to say less than 3% of the Syrian population. 
Such a percentage, quite low in contrast with Jordan and Lebanon, and a strong Arab nationalist stance, 
explains how the Palestinian refugees in Syria enjoyed social and economic rights, access to employment 
and real estate propriety. Although they did not benefit from political rights and are taken care of by the United 
Nation Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNWRA), the Palestinian have been gradually 
integrated into Syrian society and some camps, such as Yarmuk in Damascus, are now part of the city. 
Moreover, the Ba’ath regime has attempted to control the Palestinian social and political organizations. In 
1966, the state supported the creation of the Sa’iqa to counter the influence of the Fatah, against which Syria 
fought during the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990) and after the Oslo peace agreement (1993).  
Regarding the Iraqi refugees in Syria, most of them fled the sectarian violence that devastated their 
country after the US invasion in 2003, though Syria was already a refuge and a space of transit for Iraqis for 
political and economic causes prior to this date.9 Conditions of entry and stay in Syria became stricter for 
Iraqis between 2005 and 2007, because of the massive inflows of refugees, but the obligation to have a 
visa is partly enforced. Most Iraqis in Syria reside in the cities: Damascus and its suburbs, Aleppo, Latakia, 
Deir ez-Zor. They usually regroup on the basis of sectarian affiliation be that Sunni, Shia, Christian 
Chaldean or Assyrian. The last group, who can benefit from migration networks, are overrepresented. 
Those arrived in 2004-2005 usually belong to middle and high social classes, while those who arrived later 
rarely have financial capital. Their sources of income are irregular: savings brought from Iraq, currency sent 
by their family, and revenues from informal labour (construction for men and sewing for women). Many 
hope to leave Syria and settle in another country, in particular in Europe or in North America. However, very 
few have benefited from family reunification schemes or the resettlement programs of the UNHCR. 
Presently, the future of Iraqi refugees remain a crucial issue in a context of increasing violence in Syria with 
the continuing absence of political stability in Iraq.  
                                                            
9 For example, Iraqis from Iranian origin expelled in 1969-1971 and in 1980; Kurdish Iraqis fleeing repression in the late 
1980s; and economic migrants during the international embargo (1991-2003). 
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Syria’s socio-
political 
framework 
Outward migration Inward migration 
Labour Refugees Labour Refugees 
Governmental 
Institutions 
 Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
and Emigrants 
- Security 
apparatus 
 Syrian Army 
- Ministry of 
Interior 
 Ministry of 
Social Affairs 
and Labour
  GAPAR 
(General 
Authority for 
Palestinian Arab 
Refugees)
Governmental 
Strategy 
 Facilitate 
temporary low 
skilled labour 
migration, in 
particular toward 
Lebanon. 
 Limit brain drain. 
 Control the 
departure of 
Syrian 
refugees 
toward 
Lebanon and 
Turkey (since 
Spring 2011)
 Regulate the 
employment of 
foreign 
domestics and 
guarantee their 
rights. 
 Support the 
rights of 
Palestinian 
refugees. 
 Control the 
Palestinian social 
and political 
organizations.
Civil Society 
Actions 
 FEARAB 
(Federation of 
the Arab 
Entities)  
Opponents: 
 CNS (Syrian 
National 
Council) 
 OSDH (Syrian 
Observatory for 
the Human 
Rights) 
N/A  Unions
 Human Rights 
Organizations 
 Communal 
Organisations 
(national, 
sectarian, 
ethnic). 
Challenges  Develop 
partnership with 
third countries 
to promote 
labour migration 
(Lebanon, Arab 
Gulf, Western 
countries). 
Halt repression 
and violence and 
implement large-
scale political 
reforms. 
 Facilitate labour 
migration, protect 
the rights of 
foreign workers, 
and guarantee 
the working 
conditions of 
Syrian labourers. 
- Define and 
implement an 
asylum policy, in 
particular for the 
Iraqi refugees. 
International 
Cooperation 
- Agreement of 
Social and 
Economic 
Cooperation and 
Coordination with 
Lebanon on 
September13th 
1993. 
- UNHCR
- International, 
Turkish and 
Lebanese 
NGOs. 
N/A  UNHCR
 UNICEF 
 UNRWA 
(1) This socio-political framework does not claim exhaustive coverage but intends rather to provide a synthetic picture of socio-political 
facets and policy developments shaping migration developments and governance in, across, and from Syria 
 
The socio-political framework is based on data and papers available for download on the CARIM web-site 
(www.carim.org). 
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